Edens: The Prime Obstacle to a Redevelopment of South Carolina Water Law by Toal, Jean H.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 23 Issue 1 Article 7 
1971 
Edens: The Prime Obstacle to a Redevelopment of South Carolina 
Water Law 
Jean H. Toal 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Toal, Jean H. (1971) "Edens: The Prime Obstacle to a Redevelopment of South Carolina Water Law," South 
Carolina Law Review: Vol. 23 : Iss. 1 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss1/7 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
EDENS: THE PRIME OBSTACLE TO A
REDEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
WATER LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the largest obstacles to any sweeping revision of South
Carolina's present riparian rights approach to water regulation
is the present very conservative South Carolina law in the field
of eminent domain. The purpose of this study is to outline
South Carolina's position and discuss its relation to the possi-
bility of a switch from riparian rights to some form of prior
appropriation.
II. Ti PRoBLEm
For over fifteen years there has been interest expressed in
South Carolina in a complete revamping of this state's approach
to water and water rights legislation.' Since the concept of
riparian rights, South Carolina's current approach to this area,
involves the notion of private ownership of a water right,2 any
change to an appropriation system would involve a reallocation
of these water rights and thus, it could be argued, a "taking" by
the state of a private property right for which compensation
would be required,3 if indeed the plan were constitutional at all.
The problem becomes a two-pronged one. First, South Carolina
case law makes a very marked distinction between an exercise
of the power of eminent domain and an exercise of the police
power.4 Generally, the court prefers to restrict the use of police
power so that the change to appropriation would probably be
viewed as an exercise of eminent domain with its resulting re-
quirement of compensation. 5 If this is true, the second problem
1. See Special Issue on. Water Law, 5A S.C.L.Q. 103 (1952).
2. Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Public Service Auth., 216 S.C.
500, 522-24, 59 S.E.2d 132, 141-42 (1950), although Rice Hope did involve
state flooding, and thus a taking of other property rights, it was also held
in this case that a destruction of plaintiff's riparian rights in streams and in
other waters which were on his property was compensible under eminent
domain principles.
3. S.C. ConsT. art. I, § 17 provides in part:
Private property shall not be taken for private use without the
consent of the owner, nor for public use without just compensa-
tion being first make therefor.
4. Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 571, 91 S.E.2d 280, 282
(1956); Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 547-52, 88 S.E.2d 683,
687-89 (1955).
5. The reason for this opinion will be discussed in detail in section III
infra.
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is that South Carolina has a very narrow view of what consti-
tutes a public use for which the eminent domain power can be
constitutionally invoked.6
III. EDENS: A'cESTORS AND PROGENY
A. Ancestors
Edens ,v. City of Columbia7 is the example of the kind of
havoc the South Carolina court could well play with even the
most carefully drawn statutory scheme for redevelopment and
reallocation of existing property rights. In 1946, the South
Carolina General Assembly inaugurated a progressive urban
redevelopment program with its enactment of the Redevelop-
ment Law.8 The idea behind this statute was that many cities
or counties with slum or incipient slum areas would set up
Housing Authorities to prepare redevelopment programs. To
implement the plan, the Authority would have the power to
acquire property by eminent domain, raze it, and make it avail-
able to either public or private interests by sale for housing, in-
dustrial, or recreational redevelopment in accordance with the
predetermined plan. The Authority could acquire federal, state,
and local funds by bond, tax, loan, or contribution in further-
ance of its purposes.9
Eventually, all fifty states and the District of Columbia
adopted statutes like this one. In 1954, the United States Su-
preme Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of the
District's redevelopment law in the case of Berman v. Parker.1 0
The controversy in Berman centered on a definition of what
constituted a "public use" such as would support an exercise of
the power of eminent domain. The property owners argued that
the project took from one businessman for the benefit of an-
other. The Supreme Court countered with a very expansive
definition of "public use":
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the
right to realize it through the exercise of eminent
domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is
merely the means to the end. Once the object is within
6. Edens, discussed infra, is the main authority for this statement.
7. 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E2d 280 (1956).
8. XLIV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 1450 (No. 531, 1946), later S.C. CODE
ANNt. §§ 36-401--414 (1952) [declared unconstitutional in Eden v. City of
Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E2d 280 (1956)].
9. See, Morris, The Quiet Revolution: Eminent Domain and Urban Re-
development, 52 A.B.AJ. 355 (1966).
10. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
[Vol. 23
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the authority of Congress, the means by which it will
be attained is also for Congress to determine. Here one
of the means chosen is the use of private enterprise for
redevelopment of the area . . . . [T]he means of exe-
cuting the project are for Congress and Congress alone
to determine, once the public purpose has been estab-
lished. The public end may be as well or better served
through an agency of private enterprise than through a
department of government-or so Congress might con-
clude."
The Court made a rather nice distinction by finding that the
end, urban rehabilitation, was within the ambit of the police
power-public safety, health and the like. Thus, the phrase
"public purpose" in an eminent domain statute or constitutional
provision would refer to the police power in the Supreme
Court's view. Eminent domain itself would be no more than
the vehicle of the sovereign's will. But, more subtly, this view
is one which equates public purpose with public welfare or
benefit.
Most states have used this sort of argument to overrule con-
stitutional challenges to similar statutes. There are only three
states which have sustained a constitutional challenge to a
redevelopment law of the Edens-Beman variety.
12
The issue in Edenw was also one of defining "public use."
The South Carolina. court viewed the argument that eminent
domain stems from and is an adjunctive implementor of the
police power as an unusual and unsatisfactory one. They
pointed to the distinction between compensation in the case of
eminent domain and no compensation in the case of an exercise
of police power as an indication that the two were somehow
different. Striking at the heart of the usual justification for
these plans, the court stated:
Some cases take the very broad view that "public use"
is synonomous with "public benefit". A more restricted
view, however, would seem better to comport with the
11. Id. at 33-34 (citations omitted).
12. South Carolina: Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d
280 (1956); Georgia: Housing Authority of Atlanta v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 560,
74 S.E.2d 891 (1953); Florida: Adams v. Housing Authority of Daytona
Beach, 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952); noted from Morris, supra note 9, at 358
n.16.
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due protection of private property against spoilation
under the guise of eminent domain.13
The court relied on Riley v. Oharleston Union ,Statian, Go.1s
and Bookhart v. CentraZ Electio Power Co-op.'5 in support of
this restricted view.
Bookhart is an anomoly in many ways. There it was held that
a rural electric co-operative could be classified by the legisla-
ture as a public service corporation and thus be given the power
of eminent domain. Yet, the case also contains language almost
identical to that quoted supra at note 13 from Edens.10 This
language is also found in the Riley decision' 7 where it is quoted
from the 1883 edition of Judge Cooley's treatise on Comtitu-
tionaZ Limitations.18 The 1903 edition of this work updates the
"public use" definition contained in the earlier version stating:
[W]hile there are unquestionably some objections to
compelling a citizen to surrender his property to a cor-
poration... influenced by motives of private gain and
emolument, so that to them the purpose of the appro-
priation is altogether private, yet conceding [the pur-
pose of the plan is] a public necessity, if the legislature
. . . decide the general benefit is better promoted by
their construction through individuals or corporations
than by the state itself, it would clearly be pressing a
constitutional maxim to an absurd extreme if it were
held that the public necessity should only be provided
for in a way which is least consistent with the public
interest.19
Cooley's 1903 statement goes to the heart of the majority
American federal and state board "public benefit" view of this
question,"0 and yet the 1951 Bookhart opinion and the 1956
Edens opinion cited Cooley in support of a description of the
public benefit theory as "apparently generally abandoned" 121
13. Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 571-72, 91 S.E2d 280, 282-83
(1956).
14. 71 S.C. 457, 51 S.E. 485 (1905).
15. 219 S.C. 414, 65 S.E2d 781 (1951).
16. Id. at 431, 65 S.E.2d at 788.
17. Riley v. Charleston Union Station Co., 71 S.C. 457, 485-86, 51 S.E.
485, 496 (1905).
18. T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LmiTAnoNS 654 (5th ed. 1883).
19. T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 776 (7th ed. 1905).
20. See, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) and material cited solpra at
notes 8 & 11.
21. Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 572, 91 S.E.2d 280, 283
(1956) ; Bookhart v. Central Electric Power Co-op., 219 S.C. 414, 431, 65
S.E.2d 781, 788 (1951).
[Vol. 2
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This is the sort of blind adherence to precedent which is some-
times applauded as interesting fodder for the academic, but in
the present case it results in a disastrous stultification of legis-
lative attempts to meet and accept the challenge of industriali-
zation in South Carolina.
In writing the Redevelopment Law, the General Assembly
had done as Judge Cooley suggested, that is, they set out in the
very clearest terms their intention to declare the act a matter of
public use or benefit.22 Yet Edens ruled this judgment was
ultimately a judicial one. The Edens court went on to rule the
provision unconstitutional and with it the entire act fell.
B. Edens Progeny
In MHills Mill v. Hawkins,23 the court held, over the objection
of property owners who had already built private facilities,
that an act creating Una Water District in Spartanburg County
was not an unconstitutional taking even though the landowners
were given no voice in the formation of the water district. The
court accepted the legislature's finding that the public welfare
would be served by this legislation. The dissent, citing Edens,
suggested that this finding was not within the legislative pre-
rogative and argued that the act was unconstitutional. 24 Eden's
absence from the majority opinion is conspicuous, but the Mills
case involved a more obvious and accepted public health interest
-sewage control-and thus under an Edens analysis might be
viewed as a police power case. If so, it is no real dilution of the
Edens holding, yet it is intriguing that Mills justified public
use by stating that private property values would be enhanced
by the formation of the district.25 But, if Mills were viewed as
an erosion of Edens, the Mills court also admits that a prime
motivation for their decision was not a desire to challenge that
precedent but rather a feeling that the investment of "millions
22. S.C. CODE AN. § 36-403 (1952) entitled "Legislative Findings" pro-
vided in part:
(4) . .. [T]he elimination of conditions of blight, the acquisition
and preparation of land in or necessary to the development of
blighted areas and its sale or lease for development or redevlop-
ment in accordance with general plans of communities . . . are
public uses and purposes for which public money may be expended
and private property acquired ....
(5) . . . [Tihe necessity in the public interest for the provisions
hereinafter enacted is hereby declared as a matter of legislative
determination.
23. 232 S.C. 515, 103 S.E.2d 14 (1957). Accord, Distin v. Bolding, 240 S.C.
545, 126 S.E.2d 649 (1962).
24. Id. at 538, 103 S.E.2d at 25 (Legge, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 531, 103 S.E.2d at 21.
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of dollars in bonds... issued and outstanding"20 in reliance on
the act must be protected.
If Mills let in a ray of hope, it was doused the next year by
Collins v. City of Greenville,27 in which the misinterpretation
of Cooley via Riley, Bookhart, and Edens was reiterated as it
was again held that public use and public benefit are not
synonymous in South Carolina. The plaintiff in Collins unsuc-
cessfully attempted what was finally accomplished in Kline v.
City of Columbia,28 that is, he argued that a negligent act of the
city which damaged him constituted a taking of property for
which he was entitled to compensation. The court denied the
argument by using the narrow construction of public use. This
is nothing short of legal casuistry. The later Kline decision, in-
volving the same degree of injury in this writer's opinion, tried
to distinguish Collins but effectively overruled it by expanding
public use to include what looks very much like a tortious act
of the sovereign. Eminent domain was used to afford recovery
of actual damages; without it the recovery would have flown
directly in the face of South Carolina's very strict sovereign
immunity doctrine.29 It seems strange that the court could apply
eminent domain so liberally in a tort situation in which it is so
infrequently used in American jurisdictions, and yet refuse a
well accepted and much more traditional majority view of
eminent domain's application in an area for which it clearly
seems designed.
The most recent application of Edens is Young v. Wig-
gins,30 a suit by landowners in the Ebenezer Community Water-
shed District to enjoin the district's use of the condemnation
power granted them by the General Assembly.31 The use was
held constitutionally invalid and again the court cited the
Edens-Riley-Bookhart language discussed supra.32  The legis-
lature has attempted to cure the constitutional defect by re-
quiring referenda involving all electors in the proposed dis-
trict,33 but it would appear that another constitutional challenge
26. Id. at 527, 103 S.E2d at 19.
27. 233 S.C. 506, 105 S.E.2d 704 (1958).
28. 249 S.C. 532, 155 S.E.2d 597 (1967).
29. This writer has expressed the view that Kline represents an almost
total abrogation of the municipal tort immunity doctrine. See Property Sur-
vey, 19 S.C.L. REv. 635, 637-40 (1967).
30. 240 S.C. 426, 126 S.E.2d 360 (1962).
31. L S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 2344 (No. 1085, 1958).
32. Young v. Wiggins, 240 S.C. 426, 432-35, 126 S.E.2d 360, 363-65 (1962).
33. LIV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 106 (No. 82, 1967); LV S.C. STATS. AT
LARGE 1158 (No. 613, 1967). The codified sections of these acts are found
at S.C. CODE ANx. §§ 63-171-191 (Supp. 1967).
[Vol. 2
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in the manner of Young might well be successful since the court
in Young indicated its opinion that a watershed district was
not a public use.
34
IV. A STATUTORY INCONSiSTENCY
South Carolina has a statute governing drainage rights of
way which provides for private condemnation of a right of way
through another's land in the event drainage is needed and the
landowner over whose land the right is sought refuses to grant
it. 35 The provisions date back to at least 1881, but there has
been no case law ruling on their constitutionality or effect. To
distinguish drainage districts, slum clearance for city housing
only, and sewerage districts from redevelopment plans involving
some private activity on the basis that the former involve police
power and the latter eminent domain, so that the former are
constitutional and the latter not, seems completely illogical to
this writer. It is ironic, to say the least, that a private individ-
ual has a power over another's property rights which the state
does not!
V. CONCLUSION
With the exception of the provision discussed in section IV
supra, South Carolina's legislative attempts at creating a larger
scope for eminent domain have been of little effect. Edens and
related opinions have demonstrated clearly that they have the
capacity to devastate the most carefully designed restructuring
34. Young v. Wiggins, 240 S.C. 426, 433-35, 126 S.E2d 360, 363-65 (1962).
35. S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 18-51 to -76 (1962). Sections 18-51 and 18-52 pro-
vide in part:
Right to open waterway for drainige.-Any person owning lands
which can only be properly drained through or over lands of other
persons through or over which there is no right of way, sufficient
waterway or ditch cut may, as hereinafter provided, enter con-
struct and cut a waterway or ditch through and over such lands
to the nearest waterway, ditch, stream or outlet then existing.
Initiation of proceedings when servient tenant objects.-If any
owner or owners of such surrounding or adjacent lands shall
signify his or their refusal to the opening of a sufficient waterway
or ditch through such lands without previous compensation the
person requiring such waterway or ditch shall give ten days'
notice in writing to the person or persons through whose lands
such waterway or ditch is required of his intention to cut, open
and establish such waterway or ditch, naming in such notice a
person who will act as referee for him in the location thereof and
such owner or owners shall, within ten days thereafter, appoint
a referee for the same purpose.
(Emphasis added).
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of South Carolina Water Law. The Kline and Mills Mill de-
cisions provide some justification for thinldng that in the future
the court will be willing to accept a view of eminent domain as
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